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PARTIES AND CASE COORDINATION
The parties directly involved in this Appeal are Arco
Electric, Inc., Petitioner ("Arco"), and the Utah State Tax
Commission, Respondent ("Commission").

However, the appeal

involves sales or use taxes, the responsibility for which falls
on Granite School District ("Granite") and the Corporation of the
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints ("LDS Church"), arising from two separate construction
projects.
Because the fact situations, contract documents and
applicable law relating to these two projects are different, two
separate briefs on behalf of Arco have been filed, one relating
to that portion of the assessment attributable to purchases made
by Granite ("Granite's Brief") and the other brief relating to
that portion of the assessment attributable to purchases made by
the LDS Church ("LDS Church Brief").

An Amicus Curiae brief in

support of Arco has also been filed by Brigham Young University
("BYU Brief").
The Commission has filed one brief in response to the
three briefs.

Two separate reply briefs are being filed, one

with respect to purchases made by the LDS Church and this Reply
Brief relating to purchases made by Granite.

Granite, however,

joins in the argument set forth in the Argument portion of the
LDS Church's Reply Brief.

S:\tc\304
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REPLY TO COMMISSIONS STATEMENT OF ISSUE
The Commission's Statement of the Issue is not only
inaccurate, it assumes legal conclusions which are the very
subject of this appeal.

The statement asserts the Commission

determined Arco Electric to be the "ultimate consumer" of the
materials at issue.

The Commission made no such determination.

The statement concludes Arco "used" materials purchased by
Granite for installation.

The very issue before this Court is

whether the act of installation by Arco constitutes a taxable
"use" or event for sales and use tax purposes.

Finally, the

statement asserts the governing contract was a "furnish and
install" contract.

This characterization of the contract is

inaccurate with respect to the materials at issue because any
contractor obligation to furnish such materials was eliminated
when Granite elected to purchase and furnish such materials
itself and executed change orders to that effect.
The statement of the issues set forth in Granite's
Brief accurately sets forth the issues to be decided by this
Court.
REPLY TO COMMISSIONS STATEMENT OF FACTS
In Granite's Brief, a detailed statement of facts was
set forth which covered the full relationship of the parties
including the contract provisions and their actual conduct.

The

Commission does not question, challenge or even address Granite's
statement of facts.

Rather, the Commission sets forth certain

selected facts (mostly some contract provisions) which paint a
<* \tc\304
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misleading picture of the relationship between and actions of the
parties.
For example, the Commission cites from one contract
provision that "there was no reduction in the amount of coverage
or any deduction for premiums for those bonds [performance and
payment bonds] and insurance."

Commission Brief 5.

What the

Commission fails to note is that this contract provision was
between Granite and the general contractor, Broderick & Howell
only.

This provision is irrelevant to Arco (the subcontractor),

because no bonds were required to be furnished by Arco under its
subcontract agreement with Broderick & Howell.
Facts, Exhibit C, p. 3.

Stipulation of

Further, the unrefuted evidence at the

hearing was that Broderick & Howell received, with Granite's
consent, a refund on the performance and payment bond premium to
reflect the reduction in the total amount of the contract
attributable to the amount of materials purchased by Granite.
Tr. pp. 143, 150-151, 170.
As another example, the Commission emphasizes one
contract provision that imposes risk of loss to materials
purchased by Granite on the contractor, Broderick & Howell.
Commission Brief 4.

However, the Commission fails to note that

in reality no risk of loss was imposed on the contractor or any
subcontractors, such as Arco, because risk of loss was fully
covered under an insurance policy maintained by Granite.
Findings p. 12. The only insurance provided or required of
Broderick & Howell or Arco was general liability insurance which
S:\tc\304
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did not cover risk of loss or liability with respect to materials
purchased by Granite.

Tr. pp. 4 6-47, 130-131.

In addition, the Commission misquotes its own findings
by stating that "the General and Supplementary Conditions [the
primary provisions on the direct purchase procedures] between
Granite and the contractor, Broderick & Howell, were incorporated
into subcontract agreements between Granite and Arco by
reference."

Commission Brief 6.

In reality, such Conditions

were incorporated by reference in the subcontract agreements
between Arco and Broderick & Howell.

Findings p. 10. There were

no contract agreements between Arco and Granite.
Further, the unrefuted evidence at the hearing was that
the parties considered their relationships and obligations
different with respect to materials purchased by Granite as
compared to materials purchased by Broderick & Howell or Arco
even though contract provisions may have suggested otherwise.
Tr. pp. 41, 42, 44, 49, 126, 128, 130, 131, 132, 142, 147, 168,
176.

In its statement of facts, the Commission ignores this

evidence.
In short, Granite asserts the facts set forth by the
Commission do not accurately describe the relationship and
actions of the parties, do not fully reflect the evidence or even
the Commission's own findings and emphasize selected contract
provisions out of context.

Granite urges this Court to rely on

the Statement of Facts in Granite's Brief in analyzing the issues
before it.
s \tc\304
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The legislature has clearly granted Granite, a
political subdivision of the State of Utah, an exemption from
sales and use taxes for materials purchased and paid for by
Granite and used in its essential governmental functions.

In

this case, the Commission has tried to change the result of this
exemption by asserting interpretations contrary to the clear
language of the governing statutes and its own rules.

Granite

does not seek to broaden the applicable exemption statute or
rules, it simply seeks to receive the benefits of the exemption
already permitted by statute and already authorized by the
Commission's own rules.
The correction-of-error standard of review should apply
because this Court is as competent as the Commission to interpret
the applicable statues and apply this Court's prior rulings to
the straightforward facts of this case.
The direct purchase procedures used by Granite in this
case follow the guidance of this Court, comply with the governing
statutes, and comply with the Commission's own rules. Because
Granite purchased and paid for the subject materials which were
incorporated into the schools owned by Granite, the sale of the
materials was specifically exempt under the Commission's own
rules (Rule 42S and Rule 58S(A)(4), infra).

The Commission

continues to ignore the clear language of these rules.
The Commission argues that even though Arco was not the
purchaser of the subject materials, a use tax should,
S:\tc\304
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nevertheless, be imposed on Arco because Arco installed the
subject materials into the school buildings and because of
installation obligations assumed by Arco.

It is clear, however,

under decisions by this Court and the Commission's own rules,
that the use tax does not apply to this case because the subject
materials were purchased in Utah and because Arco was not the
purchaser of the materials.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE STANDARD OF REVIEW IN THIS APPEAL SHOULD BE THE
'CORRECTION-OF-ERROR' RATHER THAN 'REASONABLENESS OR
RATIONALITY' STANDARD.

The focus of t h i s appeal i s on the Commission's
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of c e r t a i n s a l e s and use tax s t a t u t e s . 1
Granite and the LDS Church submit t h a t the

Arco,

"correction-of-error"

standard of review should apply to those i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s .

The

Commission a s s e r t s i t has been given both express and implied
a u t h o r i t y to i n t e r p r e t the provisions at issue and t h e r e f o r e ,

the

"reasonableness" standard of review should apply.
To support i t s "express a u t h o r i t y " argument the
Commission c i t e s Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-118 (1987) which s t a t e s :
The administration of t h i s chapter [sales and uses
taxes] i s vested in and s h a l l be exercised by the
Commission which may p r e s c r i b e forms and r u l e s t o
conform with t h i s chapter for the making of
x

In i t s d e c i s i o n , t h e Commission d i s c u s s e s A r c o ' s l i a b i l i t y under both
s a l e s and use t a x concepts without any c l e a r a n a l y s i s of which would apply t o
t h e i n s t a n t s i t u a t i o n and why. However, t h e Commission s a i d Arco was l i a b l e
f o r "use" t a x on t h e m a t e r i a l a t i s s u e . Findings p . 35. As d i s c u s s e d below
i n s e c t i o n VI, t h e use t a x does not apply because t h e m a t e r i a l s a t i s s u e were
purchased i n Utah. N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e Commission i n i t s b r i e f c o n t i n u e s t o
b l e n d and confuse s a l e s and use t a x c o n c e p t s . Accordingly, G r a n i t e w i l l r e f e r
t o b o t h s a l e s and use t a x p r i n c i p l e s t o demonstrate t h a t Arco i s not l i a b l e
for e i t h e r .
o.\i-<-\304
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returns and for the ascertainment, assessment, and
collection of the taxes imposed under this
chapter.
Utah Code Ann. §59-12-118.
This statute focuses on the general administration of
Utah's sales and use taxes. Nowhere in the statute is there a
specific legislative grant of authority to interpret statutory
terms in general or to interpret the specific statutory terms at
issue in the case.

Granite is not aware of any decision by a

Utah appellate court which found that this statute grants the
Commission express authority to interpret the governing statutes.
In this Court's leading case on standard of review,
Morton International Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah State
Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991), the Court indicated
that in order to find express authority to interpret specific
statutory terms the grant of authority must directly refer to the
specific terms at issue.

Id. at 588.2

In short, the Commission's argument that it has been
granted express authority to interpret the governing statutory
terms at issue is without merit.
In support of its argument that it has "implied
authority," the Commission asserts that the terms of the
governing statutes are "broad and general," resulting in an

2
In Morton International, the statutory term "equipment" was at issue.
The general administration statute (§ 59-12-118) was present at such time, and
yet this Court found no "explicit grant of authority" had been granted to the
Commission to determine what constituted "equipment." Id. at 592.

S:\tc\304
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implied l e g i s l a t i v e grant of d i s c r e t i o n to i n t e r p r e t . 3

The key

s t a t u t o r y terms in t h i s case are "purchaser,» " r e t a i l s a l e , "
"sale" and "use."

All of the terms except the term "purchaser"

are defined by s t a t u t e .

None of these terms are complex or

t e c h n i c a l nor are they overly broad or g e n e r a l .

Moreover, these

terms have been analyzed and applied by t h i s Court to fact
s i t u a t i o n s in several p r i o r decisions and the Commission r e l i e s
on those p r i o r cases to support i t s decision in t h i s case. 4

By

arguing t h a t the reasonableness standard applies t o t h i s case the
Commission i s , in essence, a l s o asking t h i s Court to defer to the
Commission's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of those p r i o r c a s e s .

This Court can

apply i t s own r u l i n g s to the f a c t s of t h i s case and should give
no deference t o the Commission's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of those c a s e s .
This Court i s j u s t as well s u i t e d as the Commission to
apply usual s t a t u t o r y construction t o o l s and i t s e x p e r t i s e to
i n t e r p r e t the terms and provisions at i s s u e .

In Chris & Dick's

Lumber & Hardware v. State Tax Commission, 791 P.2d 511 (Utah
1990), t h i s Court s t a t e d t h a t " [ i ] n the usual case, questions of
s t a t u t o r y construction are matters of law for the c o u r t s , and we
r e l y on a ' c o r r e c t i o n of e r r o r ' standard of review, according no

3

The Commission a l s o c i t e s t h e g e n e r a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s t a t u t e (§ 59-12118) a s a g r a n t of implied d i s c r e t i o n t o i n t e r p r e t .
If t h i s were t h e c a s e ,
t h e c o r r e c t i o n - o f - e r r o r s t a n d a r d would never be a v a i l a b l e with r e s p e c t t o t h e
review of a s a l e s or use t a x d e c i s i o n by t h e Commission.
4

The Commission c i t e s Utah Concrete Products Corp. v. S t a t e Tax
Commission, 101 Utah 513, 125 P.2d 408 (1942), Ford J . Twaits v. Utah S t a t e
Tax Commission, 106 Utah 343, 148 P.2d 343 (1944), Olson C o n s t r u c t i o n Company
v . S t a t e Tax Commission, 12 Utah 2d 42, 361 P.2d 1112 (1961), and Tummurru
T r a d e s , I n c . v . Utah S t a t e Tax Commission, 802 P.2d 715 (1990). Findings p .
18 and Commission Brief 20.

deference to an administrative agency's interpretation."
513.

Id. at

The Court then determined that "the question of statutory

interpretation appears to be rather straightforward and of the
type we can easy settle by resorting to the usual tools of
statutory construction."

Id. at 514.

The rationale of the Chris & Dick's Lumber decision has
been affirmed at least twice by this Court in the last two years.
In Savage Industries, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 811 P.2d
664 (Utah 1991), the Court noted that
decisions involving statutory interpretation,
issues of basic legislative intent, or
construction of ordinary terms in the organic
statute of an agency involve areas in which an
appellate court is as well suited to decide the
legal questions as is the agency. In cases where
the basic question is what does the law require?
the standard is a correction of error standard.5
Id. at 668.
In r e j e c t i n g the reasonableness standard of review
proposed by the Commission, t h i s Court s t a t e d t h a t
the intermediate standard of review
['reasonableness'] i s only t o be applied in areas
of agency t e c h n i c a l e x p e r t i s e or in areas where
the l e g i s l a t u r e has s p e c i f i c a l l y granted the
agency d i s c r e t i o n in i t s decision-making p r o c e s s .
For most questions of basic s t a t u t o r y
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n or construction of the law, the
court i s as s u i t e d to decide the i s s u e s involved
as i s the agency and therefore w i l l review the
agency decision for c o r r e c t n e s s .
Id.

(footnote omitted)

5

While
Savage c a s e ,
standard i s
the holdings
S:\tc\304

t h e Utah A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Procedures Act ("UAPA") governed t h e
t h e Court was c l e a r t o p o i n t out t h a t t h e c o r r e c t i o n of e r r o r
"mandated whether a r r i v e d a t under t h e terms of t h e UAPA o r under
of our p r i o r case l a w . " I d . a t 670.

9

Also, in the recent case of Hales Sand & Gravel, Inc.
v. State Tax Commission, 200 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (November 12,
1992), the issue before this Court was whether certain
transportation charges were subject to sales tax under Utah Code
Ann. § 59-12-103(1) (a) or whether such charges were exempt under
Utah Code Ann. §59-12-104(18).

The Court determined the

correction-of-error standard should apply rather than the
reasonableness standard proposed by the Commission.

Id. 7-8 n.3.

Because the underlying sales tax statute in Hales (§ 59-12103(1)(a)) is the same as in this case, the correction-of-error
standard should also be applied in this case.
In short, the Commission's decision in this case was
based upon its interpretation of ordinary statutory terms and its
interpretation of prior decisions of this Court.

The

Commission's interpretation was not based upon any technical
expertise of the Commission6, upon the application of a complex
technical fact situation to the statute or pursuant to a specific
legislative grant of authority to interpret.

Thus, the decision

in this case is one which this Court is as competent as the
Commission to decide and the correction-of-error standard should
be applied.

6

A1though the Commission asserts it is "routinely required to determine
what constitutes a sale" (Commission Brief 17) it does not argue it has
special or technical expertise to interpret the key statutory terms.
- -~v^„
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II.

THE COMMISSION FAILS TO RESPOND TO KEY ARGUMENTS OF GRANITE.
In its Brief, Granite sets forth several arguments why

the Commission's decision in this case should be overturned.

In

response the Commission fails to address three important
arguments made by Granite.

First, that the Commission's decision

is contrary to one of its own rules, second, that the decision
ignores a key requirement in one of its other rules, and third,
that the decision is contrary to the Commission's prior practice
and prior or companion cases dealing with the same issue.
The first argument in Granite's Brief (pp. 24-26) is
that the Commission has ignored its own rule in analyzing the
facts of this case.

Utah Admin. Code R865-19-42S ("Rule 42S").

Rule 42S provides that a sale made to a political subdivision,
like Granite, of materials used in an essential governmental
function is exempt from sales tax if the sale is paid for by the
official disbursing agent.

The direct purchase procedures used

by Granite in this case specifically complied with the
requirements of Rule 42S. Granite's reliance upon Rule 42S in
its direct purchase procedures over several years is evidenced by
its reference to Rule 42S on the purchase orders used in the
construction of the school buildings.

Curiously, the Commission

continues to ignore Rule 42S and in fact, makes no response to it
at all in its brief.

If the Commission no longer believes Rule

42S is valid or does not mean what it says, the Commission should
take appropriate rulemaking or legislative steps to repeal or
modify it.
S:\tc\304
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Another argument in G r a n i t e ' s Brief

(pp. 27-28) i s t h a t

a careful reading of the Commission's own i:ule in Utah Admin.
Code R865-19-58S(A)(1)

("Rule 58S(A)(1)») s t a t e s t h a t in order

for a c o n t r a c t o r or i n s t a l l e r , l i k e Arco, to be a taxable
consumer of m a t e r i a l s for s a l e s tax purposes, i t must also be the
owner of the m a t e r i a l s .

The findings of fact and unrefuted

evidence presented at formal hearing show that Arco was not the
owner of the m a t e r i a l s .

The Commission continues to c i t e and

r e f e r to Rule 58S(A)(1) as if no ownership requirement i s
necessary.
The Commission further f a i l s to respond to G r a n i t e ' s
argument t h a t i t s decision i s i n c o n s i s t e n t with i t s p r i o r
p r a c t i c e s and p r i o r or companion exemption cases.

As noted in

G r a n i t e ' s Brief, the d i r e c t purchase procedures followed by
Granite and other tax-exempt e n t i t i e s have been successfully used
for several y e a r s .

In addition, the governing contract language

and f a c t s in both Home Construction Corp. v. State Tax
Commission, Appeal No. 85-0118 (November 27, 1987), and Layton
Construction Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission, Appeal No. 86-0650
(March 9, 1992), are v i r t u a l l y i d e n t i c a l to t h a t in G r a n i t e ' s
p o r t i o n of t h i s case. 7

However, in those cases the Commission

held the d i r e c t purchases by the tax-exempt e n t i t i e s were exempt
from s a l e s and use t a x e s .

Also, as set forth in d e t a i l in the

7

The c o n t r a c t p r o v i s i o n i n v o l v i n g t h e d i r e c t p u r c h a s e s of m a t e r i a l s i n
Home were not i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e Home d e c i s i o n a t t a c h e d as Addendum C t o
G r a n i t e ' s B r i e f . The d i r e c t purchase c o n t r a c t p r o v i s i o n s i n Home a r e
a t t a c h e d h e r e t o as Addendum 1 and a r e almost verbatim t o t h o s e i n t h i s c a s e .
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LDS Church Brief, the conclusions of law issued by the Commission
are internally contradictory and inconsistent and offer confusing
direction to taxpayers and tax-exempt entities, as well.
In its brief, the Commission offers no explanation for
these differences.
III. THE ACT OF INSTALLATION OF TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY TO
REAL PROPERTY BY SOMEONE OTHER THAN THE PURCHASER OF THE
MATERIALS IS NOT A TAXABLE EVENT.
It is undisputed that Arco installed or physically
attached the materials at issue into the two elementary school
buildings.

The Commission ruled that such act of installation

constituted a taxable event.

Findings, p. 28.

In its brief, the

Commission asserts that its decision hinges on the following
conclusions of law reached by it:

"(1) Sales of materials for

use in construction, improvement, alteration or repair of real
property for a government entity or religious institution are not
exempt (Decision and Order R. 85-86).

(2) To be exempt, the sale

must be directly to the government entity, religious institution
or charitable organization for the use of and consumption by the
exempt entity."

Id., Commission Brief 19 (emphasis in original).

The Commission then cites the following three cases
from this Court in support of its conclusions of law and its
determination that the subcontractor in this case, Arco, (rather
than the general contractor Broderick & Howell or the owner and
purchaser, Granite) was responsible for Utah use tax on the
materials.
S:\tc\304

Utah Concrete Prods. Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 101
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Utah 513, 125 P.2d 408 (1942), Ford J. Twaits Co, v. Utah Staf.P
Tax Comm'n, 106 Utah 343, 148 P.2d 343 (1944); and Tummurru
Trades v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 802 P.2d 715 (Utah 1990) .
The Commission misapplies the holdings in each of these
cases to the facts of this case.

In Utah Concrete, Twaits and

Tummurru, the contractor involved purchased and paid for the
materials on his own account and then installed the materials
into real property.

The Court appropriately determined that the

contractor in each of the cases was the purchaser and consumer of
the materials at issue.

In this case, the materials at issue

were purchased and paid for by Granite.

Unlike the contractors

in Utah Concrete, Tummurru and Twaits, vendors looked solely to a
tax-exempt entity--in this case Granite--for payment of the
materials purchased by Granite and title to the materials passed
directly to Granite without any vesting in Arco or Broderick &
Howell.
In short, the contractors in Utah Concrete, Tummurru,
and Twaits were deemed to be the taxable consumers of the
materials at issue for sales tax purposes because the contractors
were also the purchasers of the materials.

This purchaser

requirement has been reaffirmed by this Court in the recent case
of Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. State Tax Commission, 196 Utah
Adv. Rep. 18 (September 30, 1992).

The Court stated:

one who purchases building materials for use
in constructing homes, highways and the like,
is a 'real property contractor,' and the
contractor's purchase of tangible personal
property used for such purposes are taxable
transactions under the sales tax law. In
« \fc\304
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effect, a real property contractor is treated
as a consumer for sales tax purposes.
Id. 19-20 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
In other words, the focus of the inquiry should be on
the purchase of the materials and not on the installation of the
materials.

In this case Granite, not Arco, was the purchaser of

the materials at issue.

Granite paid for the materials.

suppliers looked solely to Granite for payment.

The

Title to the

materials passed directly from the suppliers to Granite.
Of particular significance to this case, the Court in
Twaits noted that the contract granted the government the right
to issue tax exempt certificates to avoid the imposition of sales
or use tax on the materials purchased.

No such certificates were

issued, however, and the Court concluded that the contractor was
liable for sales or use taxes on materials purchased.

The Court

stated:
[i]t is apparent that the government did not
intend in the instant case to exempt plaintiff
[the contractor] from local taxes. Had it so
intended, it would have been a simple matter to
authorize plaintiff to buy as an agent of the
government, to issue a tax exemption referred to
in Article 31 of the contract, or otherwise
declare the goods government property.
Ford, 148 P.2d at 344-45.

In other words, the U.S. Government

chose not to exercise its right to purchase materials directly
and thereby qualify for the exemption from sales and use taxes.
In this case, Granite elected to exercise a similar right to
purchase materials directly and thereby qualify for the

S:\tc\304
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exemption.

The direct purchase procedures utilized by Granite in

this case follow the guidance of this Court.8
IV.

THE COMMISSION ARGUES FOR A NEW INTERPRETATION OF RULE
58S(A) (4) WHICH IS CONTRARY TO ITS CLEAR LANGUAGE.
In its brief, the Commission argues for a new

interpretation of Rule 58S(A)(4), which provides:
Sales of materials to religious or charitable
institutions and government agencies are exempt
only if sold as tangible personal property and the
seller does not install the materials as an
improvement to realty or use it to repair real
property.
Utah Admin. Code R865-19-58S(A)(4) (emphasis added).
In this case none of the materials at issue were
purchased by Granite from vendors or suppliers who also installed
them and therefore the purchases should be exempt.

Despite the

clear language of Rule 58S(A)(4), the Commission asserts for the
first time in these proceedings that the 'correct' interpretation
of Rule 58S(A)(4) is that materials sold to a tax exempt entity
are exempt only if they are installed in the real property by the
tax-exempt entity.

Commission Brief 23.

Not only does this

interpretation violate the clear language of the rule, it is also
an example of how far the Commission's efforts in this case have
strayed from underlying legislative and administrative intent.
If the Commission no longer believes Rule 58(A)(4) means what it
says or does not like the results of its application, it should

8

In Utah Concrete, supra, this Court also stated that if the materials
at issue had been purchased by the governmental entity or by its agent, no
sales tax would have been owing. 12 5 P.2d at 411.
q-\tc\304
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take appropriate rulemaking or legislative steps to repeal or
modify it.
V.

REVERSING THE TAX COURT DECISION IN THIS CASE DOES NOT
RESULT IN THE BROADENING OF THE GOVERNMENTAL EXEMPTION.
In its brief, the Commission cites the case of Parson

Asphalt Products, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 617 P.2d 397
(Utah 1980) for the proposition that parties seeking exemption
from the imposition of tax bear the burden of proving their
eligibility for that exemption.

While this may be a true

characterization of this Court's statement in Parson, the correct
focus in this case is not on whether Granite is eligible for a
tax exemption, but rather, which party (Granite or Arco) was the
purchaser of the materials at issue.

That determination should

be made based on the guidelines established by this Court as
summarized in Granite's Brief, namely, giving the benefit of the
doubt to the party against whom the Commission seeks to impose a
tax.

See Granite Brief at 31.)

There has been no claim in this

case that Granite was not entitled to an exemption as long as the
sale of the materials was made "to" it. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12104 (2) (1992) .
In short, Granite does not seek any broadening of the
governmental exemption statute.

It simply seeks to receive the

benefits of the exemption already permitted by statute and
already authorized by the Commission's own rules.

S:\tc\304
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VI.

THERE IS NO AUTHORITY FOR IMPOSITION OF USE TAX AGAINST A
CONTRACTOR WHO INSTALLS PERSONAL PROPERTY PURCHASED BY A
TAX-EXEMPT OWNER.
In its brief, the Commission argues that even if the

purchases of the materials made by Granite are exempt from the
sales tax, a use tax should nevertheless be imposed on Arco
because Arco's installation of the materials constituted a
taxable use,

As authority for this position the Commission cites

Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1)(1) which provides that »[t]here is
levied a tax on the purchaser for the amount paid or charged for
. . . tangible personal property stored, used, or consumed in
this state."9

Utah Code Ann § 59-12-103 (1) (1) (1992).

Section

59-12-102(14) (a) defines "use" as the exercise of any right or
power over tangible personal property "incident to the ownership
or the leasing of that property, item, or service."

Id. § 59-12-

102(14)(a) (emphasis added).
Contrary to the assertions of the Commission in its
brief, this Court has consistently held that the use tax applies
only to property whose title was transferred outside of Utah
which was subsequently used in Utah as defined in the statute.
Utah Concrete Prods. Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 101 Utah
513, 125 P.2d 408 (1942); Union Portland Cement Co. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 110 Utah 135, 170 P.2d 164 (1946), modified bv 110 Utah

9

The separate use and sales tax acts were consolidated in 1987 by the
Unified Utah Sales and Use Tax Act. Current Section 59-12-103(1)(1) merely
restates Section 59-16-3(a) of the old use tax act which technically applies to
this case because the subject transactions occurred prior to the consolidation.
However, the substance of the two sections is the same.
s \tc\304
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152, 176 P.2d 879 (1947); Geneva Steel Co. v. State Tax Comm'n,
116 Utah 170, 209 P.2d 208 (1949).10
In this case there has been no allegation or claim that
the materials at issue were purchased outside of Utah.
In its brief, the Commission suggests that the
consolidation of the separate sales and use tax acts in 1987
modified the above noted historical and case law distinction
between the sales and use tax components of the Unified Utah
Sales and Use Tax Act.

Such argument is without merit.

In the

first place, even if a modification occurred with the
consolidation, it would not affect this case because the
assessment period at issue occurred prior to such consolidation
(i.e. the audit period was from January 1, 1982 to March 31,
1987).

Secondly, the sales and use tax distinction has been

reaffirmed by this Court after the consolidation and the
Commission's own rules continue to maintain the distinction.
In the recent case of Union Pacific Railroad Co. v.
Utah State Tax Commission, 199 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (November 6,
1992), this Court addressed the relationship between the sales
and use tax and stated:
[t]he sales tax imposes a transaction tax on
certain sales and certain services that occur in
Utah. Complementing the sales tax, the use tax
imposes an excise tax on tangible property and
certain services performed in connection with that
property, where the property is stored or used in
Utah but is not subject to Utah sales tax because

10
Section 59-12-102(14)(a) also deals with leases, but leases are not
relevant because none are present in this case.
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it was purchased or the service was performed
outside of Utah.
Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
This distinction between the sales and use tax
components of the Utah State and Use Tax Act is also set forth in
the Commission's own rule.11
Moreover, the definition of "use" in Utah Code Ann.
§ 59-12-102(14) (a) provides that there can be no taxable use of
property absent ownership of the property by the person whose use
invokes the tax.

Olson Constr. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 12 Utah

2d 42, 361 P.2d 1112 (1961); Tummurru Trades, Inc. v. Utah State
Tax Comm'n, 802 P.2d 715 (Utah 1990).

Because Arco was not the

purchaser or owner of the materials, any "use" by it with respect
to the installation of the materials is not taxable.
In short, no use tax can apply to property purchased in
Utah and used, stored or consumed in this state.

Any such

transaction is either subject to the sales tax or is not taxable.
A purchase exempt from sales tax is also exempt from use tax.
Hardy v. State Tax Comm'n, 561 P.2d 1064, 1070 (Utah 1977). Thus,
the Commission's use tax argument is not supported by statute,
case law, or its own rules.

lx
Utah Admin. Code R865-19-1S provides that "if the sale is made in Utah,
the sales tax applies. If the sale is made elsewhere, the use tax applies."
Utah Admin. Code R865-19-1SD.
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VII. ARCO'S STORAGE AND OTHER INSTALLATION RESPONSIBILITIES WITH
RESPECT TO THE SUBJECT MATERIALS DOES NOT RESULT IN A SALES
OR USE TAXABLE EVENT,
As noted above, the primary argument set forth by the
Commission in its brief is that the installation of the materials
at issue by Arco into Granite's school building facilities
constitutes a taxable event for use tax purposes.

In a different

twist to this same argument, the Commission also asserts that
Arco's storage of the materials and its installation obligations
with respect to the materials constitutes a taxable use "incident
to ownership."

The Commission cites Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-

103(1) (1) and Interwest Aviation v. County Board of Equalization,
743 P.2d 1222 (Utah 1987), as authority for this argument.
The inappropriate application of Utah Code Ann. § 5912-103(1)(1) to this case has already been explained in Section
VI (page 18) of this brief above.
The inappropriate application of Interwest to this case
is adequately discussed in the LDS Church Reply Brief.

As noted

in such Brief, if the incidents of ownership criteria set forth
by the Court in Interwest is applied to this case, it would
indicate ownership of the material in Granite and/or the LDS
Church•
Not only did Granite possess the "incidents of
ownership" noted by this Court in Interwest but if also held the
most signifies'

- .-:::;^ and burdens of ownership with

respect to the materials at issue.

(See Granite's brief at pages

36-39 for a detailed list of such benefi ts and burdens of
s:\tc\304
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ownership.)

Despite this long list of benefits and burdens of

ownership possessed by Granite, the Commission still asserts that
Arco held the most significant attributes of ownership and
further misstates Arco's role in the direct purchase procedures
and mischaracterizes several contract provisions to support this
assertion.
On page twenty-nine of its brief, the Commission states
that "Arco negotiated and administered the purchase."

Actually,

while Broderick & Howell received supplier information from Arco,
it was Broderick & Howell and not Arco, pursuant to contract and
actual practice, which assisted Granite in the negotiation and
administration of the purchase of materials by Granite.

Findings

p. 9; Tr. p. 125.
Again on page twenty-nine of its brief, the Commission
states that Arco "received, inspected and stored the property."
It is true that Arco participated in these activities pursuant to
its subcontract agreement with Broderick & Howell but the primary
responsibility for these activities rested with Broderick &
Howell.

Tr. p. 81, 125, 172-174.

Further, these activities

would be typical of a contractor or installer in any installation
activity.

Granite also inspected and tested materials. Tr.

p. 172-174.
Also on page twenty-nine of its brief, the Commission
asserts that the "risk of loss, damage, theft, vandalism or
destruction" of materials purchased by Granite was placed on
Arco.

e-\t-r\304

Actually such contractual obligation rested with Broderick

^^

& Howell.

Findings p. 9.

Further, the Commission fails to note

that in reality no risk of loss to the materials was imposed on
Broderick & Howell (or Arco for that matter) because such risk of
loss was fully covered under an insurance policy purchased and
maintained by Granite.

Findings p. 12.

On page twenty-nine of its brief, the Commission states
Arco was responsible to hold Granite harmless from any "loss,
claim, defect, discrepancy, delay and delivery or any problem"
regarding the materials.

Actually, this contractual obligation

was between Granite and Broderick & Howell (Findings p. 9 ) , and
the actual relationship and actions of the parties with respect
to the materials purchased directly by Granite and problems
relating to such materials varied from the contract provisions.
(These differences are set forth in detail in Granite's Brief
starting at page 14.)
The essence of Arco's involvement in this case was as
installer of materials purchased by Granite.

Arco also shared

with Broderick & Howell agency responsibilities in identifying
suppliers of materials and receiving such materials prior to
installation.

The assumption by Arco of such bailee

responsibilities does not nuke Arco the deemed purchaser or owner
of the materials.12

When all of the facts and circumstances are

examined, the preponderance of the benefits and burdens of

In fact, if the basis of the assessment in this case is the above
quoted contract provisions, the assessment should have been made against
Broderick & Howell, instead of Arco, because such contract provisions were
imposed on Broderick & Howell
S:\tc\304
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ownership of the materials remained with Granite.

Granite was

the real owner, purchaser and ultimate consumer of the materials.
VIII.

THE EXECUTION OF CHANGE ORDERS MODIFIED THE CONTRACT WITH
RESPECT TO MATERIALS PURCHASED BY GRANITE.
The Commission cites the following contract provision

between Granite and Broderick & Howell to argue that the
execution of change orders to the contract did not alter the
duties of the parties or change the relationship of the parties
with respect to the materials purchased by Granite:
These provisions for direct purchase by Board
[Granite] of materials and equipment shall
not relieve the Contractor [Broderick &
Howell] of any of its duties or obligations
under the contract or constitute a waiver of
[Granite's] right to absolute fulfillment of
all of the terms hereof.
Findings, pp. 9-10.

The Commission presents no facts or case law

in support of this assertion.13
As set forth in Granite's Brief, however, the unrefuted
evidence at the formal hearing was that when Granite exercised
its right to purchase materials directly, a change order to the
contract was executed and the change order had the effect of an
amendment to the contract removing the amount of the directly
purchased materials from the contract and changing the nature of
the contract.

Tr. p. 107-108, 127, 134.

In addition, the

relationship of the parties changed significantly with respect to
such directly purchased materials.

13

Tr. pp. 41, 42, 44, 49, 126,

0f particular interest to this case is the fact that this same
contract provision was present in Home. See section 15.1.6 of the Home
contract attached as Addendum 1. See also Granite's Brief pp. 40-44.
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128, 130, 131, 132, 142, 147, 168, 176.14

In essence, the

contract became an installation only contract with respect to
those materials purchased by Granite.

The Contractor, Broderick

& Howell, was not relieved of any of its contractual duties or
obligations with respect to materials not elected to be purchased
by Granite.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the correction-of-error
standard should be applied to this review and this Court should
determine that Granite was the true purchaser, owner and ultimate
consumer of the materials at issue.

The installation of the

materials by Arco was not a sales or use taxable event and the
assessment against Arco was improper.
DATED this

/Sri

day of January, 1993.

/A^
Thomas Christensen, Jr.
^^iS>—

John E. S. Robson
FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
a Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Arco & Granite

14,
Such relationship changes are set forth in detail in Granite's Brief
and the legal effect of the change orders are discussed at length in BYU's
Brief.
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ADDENDUM

1

ARTICLE 15
DIRECT PURCHASE OF MATERIAL BY THE OWNER
15.1

FURNISHING OF MATERIALS THROUGH DIRECT PURCHASE Bi 1HE OWNER

15*1« 1 The Owner shall have the r ight to furnish any part or all of the
materials and equipment which shall become a par t of the permanent structure,.,
15* 1.2
1 he Contractor" shall i negotiate and admin is tei all such direct purchases
by the Owner, and shall furnish to the Owner a description, source of supply,
trade discount information, and other information necessary to enable the Owner
to purchase directly any such materials and equipment. Purchases by the Owner
shall be made on requisition or purchase orders furnished by the Owner and signed
by the duly authorized purchasing agent of the Owner. Title to all such materials and equipment purchased by the Owner shall pass from the vendor directly to
the Owner upon delivery to the job site, without any vesting in the Contractor.
After delivery, the risk of loss, damage, theft, vandalism, or destruction of or
to any such materials and equipment purchased directly by the Owner shall lie
with the Contractor,
15*1.3 Storage of any materials and equipment fun ushed by the Owner shall be
the responsibility of the Contractor. The Contractor shall hold the Owner harmless of and from any failure of the suppliers of materials or equipment so purchased by the Owner resulting in any loss, claim, defect, discrepancy, delay in
de1 Ivery, or any prob1 em i i i re1 a ti ng to such ma teri a 1s or equ i pmen t.
15.1.4 1 he Contractor shall acknowledge receipt and approval of any such materials or equipment purchased directly by the Owner by signing the invoice for any
such materials or equipment. The Owner will make payment for any such materials
or equipment within a reasonable time after the receipt of the signed invoice
from the Contractor.
15.1.5 The Owner shall
count from the purchase
of mailing of the check
receipt by the Owner of

not be responsible for the loss of a prompt payment disprice if the Owner makes payment (determined by the date
for payment) within ten business days following the
the signed invoice from the Contractor,

15*1.6 The Contract Sum shall be reduced by the amount actually paid by the
Owner for such materials and equipment furnished by the Owner and by the sales
tax which would have been paid on such materials and equipment had they been
supplied by the Contractor. Similarly, the amount of any Progress Payment provided for the above shall be adjusted to reflect the direct purchase of any such
materials and equipment by the Owner, The Owner shall not be responsible for the
loss of or reduction in any trade discounts available to the Contractor as a
result of any purchases made by the Owner.
All bonds and insurance shall remain in full force,. There shall be no
reduction in the amount of coverage or any deduction for premiums for said bonds
and insurance. These provisions for direct purchase by the Owner of materials
and equipment shall not relieve the Contractoi of any of its duties or obligations under the Contract or constitute a waiver of the Owner's right to absolute
fulfillment of all the terms hereof.
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